Dear Friends,
It is mid-April as I write this letter to all of you from the beautiful port city of Montevideo, Uruguay, in the midst of a whirlwind tour of the national strategic colleges of Latin America. Last week I was in Ecuador, just in time to witness a constitutional crisis between all three branches of government. From Uruguay I will continue on to Argentina, Peru, and El Salvador. Then,after two whole days at home, my wife and I will head off for ten days in Provence, France, to celebrate our 30th wedding anniversary. My deepest gratitude to Jack Powelson for contributing two excellentTQE's in my absence. - Loren

MILITARY FUTURES
My consulting work brings me into frequent contact with people in the political elite of Latin America, about a third of whom have careers in the armed forces. In this essay, I would like to try to synthesize for you a perspective on the peculiar state of Latin American military institutions today, and the directions in which they may evolve in the future. A portrait of Latin American military institutions There is no "typical" or "average" Latin American military, but it is quite clear that none of them resemble the US military. Let me try to paint a picture.First and foremost, these are not war-fighting forces, with the possible exception of Chile and Brazil. Warplanes and helicopters are generally inoperable for lack of spare parts and maintenance. Radars hardly exist. Warships sit in harbor, elderly, unreliable, and lacking fuel. Armies are small and ill-equipped, with vintage trucks,non functional armor, obsolete artillery. I have seen soldiers training in sandals, because the army could not afford shoe leather. In several countries the military is a part-time occupation: everyone, from top to bottom, leaves at noon to go off to his or her second job. This surprising state of affairs is not limited to Latin America, in fact it is becoming the norm for many countries of the world. Since the end of the Cold War armed forces have been hollowed out, cut back,starved for funds, and redirected towards other missions and roles. The great exception to this trend, of course, has been the armed forces of the United States. Minor exceptions include China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and a few others. At the same time, demands on the United Nations for peacekeeping forces have steadily increased. Bangladesh is notable for managing to recoup a large fraction of its military budget through payments by the UN for its participation in peacekeeping operations. Why do militaries persist in Latin America? In the face of these trends, why do Latin American countries retain their armed forces? It isn't merely tradition, though tradition isalways important, and it isn't merely inertia. There are other forcesat work. To an extraordinary extent, Latin American states are "ownedand operated" by their political elites. They provide the top political leadership of almost every party, and their sons anddaughters staff the extensive governmental bureaucracies. For those not born to wealth and power, one of the very few reliable avenues for advancement into the political elite is through a career as an officerin the armed forces.Over and above their employment and upward mobility functions, the armed forces of many Latin American countries have frequently been called upon to protect the property rights and privileges of the political elites. This mirrors in many ways the role of the American military in preserving slavery in southern states before the CivilWar. When land reform efforts fail in Latin America, as they have all too often, the end result tends to be a decades-long civil war that its radicalized peasants against the military. For a sobering history of the Latin American land-reform disasters, I recommend JackPowelson's book The Peasant Betrayed. Can a military be abolished? The functions listed above are sufficient to make abolishing themilitary politically difficult if not impossible in most LatinAmerican countries, despite the financial and economic advantages ofsuch a move. As yet only two countries have no military: Costa Rica and Panama. However, it is important to realize that in both of these countries the police and coast guard have taken on additional rolesand functions to replace the missing military. For example, they have specialized national police units that can respond with greater force than one typically associates with a purely police function. I believe it can fairly be said that these countries have abolished their militaries in name but not in function.The history of failed states -- Somalia and Afghanistan are two recent examples -- strongly suggests that when the power and integrity of a national government decline too far, then local "strongmen" step intothe power vacuum. These may be clan or tribal or religious leaders, organized crime bosses, or former military or militia leaders (warlords). Whatever their origin, the one thing they have in common is an armed militia that they do not hesitate to use to maintain or increase their power. In short, actually abolishing a military is much more difficult than might appear at first. Similar arguments apply to intelligence services. When they are formally abolished, their functions eventually reappear within a national police agency, often giving this agency too much power for the political stability of the nation. What does the future hold? If most Latin American countries are unlikely to abolish their militaries, then what? In many ways, this is the more interesting question.For most of the smaller and poorer countries, I think we can expect to see the demise of essentially all naval and air forces, for the simple reason that they are extremely expensive. Indeed, this process is sofar advanced that it is already the de facto case. I expect that the ground forces of these countries will eventually drop down to a sustainable size that will permit specialized units to earn hard currency by serving as peacekeepers with the United Nations and other regional groupings of nations, while small professional units will provide the bare minimum necessary to deter the emergence of local warlords.For the larger countries, I wonder. Perhaps in the next quarter century we will see the emergence of a continental-scale regionalsecurity force, modeled loosely on the NATO alliance ("an attack on one is an attack on all"). This multinational force could provide naval and air coverage for the entire continent, at considerably less cost than would be incurred if each country were to attempt to maintain a full military.Ultimately, I believe, the disappearance of military organizations depends on the institutional strength of every country in the region. When every country has in place robust democratic institutionsof government, self-correcting and self-healing, with a full roster of checks and balances between all centers of power, then and only then will military organizations broadly decline to vestigial status. Without strong and healthy democratic institutions throughout the entire region, Latin American political elites will have every incentive to maintain their armed forces.On the other hand, the nightmare scenario for Latin America continues to be a return to the era of military dictatorships and police states.Fortunately, the powerful forces of modern economic development seem to be working against this scenario. Globalization, liberalized trade,increased speed of communications and transportation, the emergence of international institutions of justice: all of these work strongly against totalitarian governments of all forms. On balance, I believe that Latin American armed forces are evolving towards smaller, professional forces, with eventual integration into regional and international systems for border, coastal, and air space security. For all of us who vividly remember the bad old days of strutting caudillos and brutal secret police, this will be a welcome change.

Sincerely your friend,Loren Cobb